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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of GCG variables, firm 
size, and leverage on earnings management.  
The sample used is 35 public listed property and real estate companies in the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2015 until 2017. The sampling technique uses 
purposive sampling. This study uses multiple regression.  
The results of the analysis showed that managerial ownership does not have a 
negative effect on earnings management but oppositely, it has a positive effect on 
earnings management, while company size does not have any effect on earning 
management.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Earnings management is a condition where the management intervenes in the 
process of preparing a financial report for stakeholders so that it can flatten, raise, and 
lower earnings. Thus, the financial report received by investors or shareholders of the 
company or external companies sometimes is not the same as happened. In other word, 
the financial statements have been manipulated by management for the sake of 
unilateral interests. If this happens, the external parties will suffer losses as well as the 
owner of the company. 
Corporate governance is one way to control opportunistic actions taken by 
management. There are five principles in Good Corporate Governance/GCG 
(transparency, accountability, responsibility, independence, and fairness) are created to 
protect the interests of all stakeholders (FCGI & ADB, 2001). The implementation of 
Corporate Governance concept is expected to raise oversight and transparency in a 
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company, so that Corporate Governance acts as a factor, which influences the behavior 
of management as mention by (Watts, 2003) which stated the implementation of 
Corporate Governance as one of the ways to monitor contract issues and reduce the 
management’s opportunistic behavior. The practice of earnings management has been 
indicated to arise as an impact on agency problems or agency theory. Agency theory 
occurs because of the conflict of interests between company owners and management 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency problems, motivated principals, enter into 
contracts to maximize interests for their welfare by increasing profits. Because of 
agency problem, principals are motivated to maximize their welfare by entering into 
contract by increasing the company’s earnings, while agents are motivated to maximize 
the fulfillment of their economic and psychological needs in terms of obtaining 
investments, loans, or compensation contracts. Leverage is one effort to increase 
company profits. Companies that have high financial leverage due to the size of debt or 
liabilities compared to assets owned by the company, it is suspected that earnings 
management is caused by the company being threatened by default, which means that 
the company cannot fulfill its debt repayment obligations on time (Shanti & Yudhanti, 
2007). 
From several studies on the influence of corporate governance, company size, 
and leverage on earnings management found differences in research results. Corporate 
governance factors include institutional ownership, management ownership, as well as 
the size of the board of commissioners and leverage. Also, the results of these studies 
are still less convincing or less consistent, which can be seen from the research by 
(Veno & Sasongko, 2016) stated that committees audit and managerial ownership 
influence earnings management. Similarly, research conducted by (Jao & Pagalung, 
2011), which states that managerial ownership and institutional ownership and audit 
committees have an influence on earnings management, but leverage does not affect. 
Another thing with ownership management, the audit committee does not affect 
earnings management, but leverage affects earnings management.   
An agency relationship is defined as one in which one or more persons (the 
principals) engages another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976 (Ross, 1973). The cornerstone of agency theory is the assumption that 
the interests of principles and agents diverge. According to agency theory, the principal 
can limit divergence from hislher interests by establishing appropriate incentives for the 
agent, and by incur- ring monitoring costs designed to limit opportunistic action by the 
agent. Further, it may pay the agent to spend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that 
he/she will not take certain actions that would harm the principal, or to ensure that the 
principal will be appropriately compensated if helshe does take such action. That is, the 
agent may incur ex-ante bonding costs in order to win the right to manage the resources 
of the principal. Despite these devices, it is recognized that some divergence between 
the agent’s actions and the principal’s interests may remain. Insofar as this divergence 
reduces the principals’s welfare, it can be viewed as a residual loss. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The earnings management, according to (Setiawati & Na’im, 2000), is a 
management intervention in the external financial reporting process to benefit itself. 
Whereas according to (Wedari, 2004) earnings management is earnings manipulation 
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carried out by management to achieve certain goals. This manipulation is done so that 
profits look as expected, other than that it aims to keep investors interested in the 
company. 
(Jones, 1991) identified earnings management by measuring discretionary 
accruals. He stated that issuers conduct earnings management with an income 
increasing pattern that will have positive discretionary accruals and if discretionary 
accruals are negative for protection import from the government. 
 
Managerial ownership is the separation of ownership between the outsider and 
the insider, if a company has many shareholders, then the large group of individuals is 
unable to participate actively in the daily management of the company (Bodie & Alan, 
2006). (Melinda & Sutejo, 2008) measures managerial ownership by the number of 
company shares owned by managers and commissioners. (Lamora, Vince, & Kamaliah, 
2014) stated that with the ownership of shares held by managers, managers would act 
in harmony with the interests of shareholders to minimize the opportunistic behavior of 
managers. Management ownership can be measured by using a ratio scale that is by the 
percentage of shares held by the management of all outstanding company stock capital 
(Guna & Herawaty Arleen, 2000). 
 
Hypothesis Development 
Management ownership decreases, the incentives for the possibility of the 
opportunistic behavior of managers will increase (Jao & Pagalung, 2011). With regard 
to the effects of managerial ownership on managers’incentives, economics theory 
identifies two types: the incentive alignment effect and the management entrenchment 
effect. The literature on traditional agency theory argues that shareholdings held by 
managers help align their interests with those of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This incentive alignment effect is expected to have more impact as managerial 
ownership increases, suggesting that as managerial ownership increases, corporate 
performance increases and opportunistic managerial behavior decreases monotonically. 
The results of the research conducted by (Veno & Sasongko, 2016) state that there is an 
effect of managerial ownership on earnings management. Based on such a description, 
the hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H1: Managerial ownership has a negative effect on earnings management. 
Company ownership may consist of institutional ownership and individual 
ownership or a mixture of both with a certain proportion (Nuraina, 2012). Institutional 
ownership is the ownership of company shares owned by institutions or institutions 
such as insurance companies, banks, investment companies, and ownership of other 
institutions (Tarjo, 2008). Institutional ownership is the proportion of shares held by 
institutions such as insurance companies, pension funds, or other companies measured 
by the percentage calculated at the end of the year. Institutional ownership can be 
measured using a percentage indicator of the number of shares held by an institution 
from all share capital circulating in the stock market (Boediono, 2005). 
Institutional ownership has a negative influence on the practice of earnings 
management, where the smaller the percentage of institutional ownership, the greater 
the existence of managerial trends in making certain policies to manipulate earnings 
reporting (Werner R. Murhadi, 2009).  This statement is supported by the results 
expressed by (Jao & Pagalung, 2011). However, this is different from the research 
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conducted by (Guna & Herawaty Arleen, 2000) which states that institutional 
ownership does not affect earnings management, nor is it revealed in a study conducted 
by (Agustia, 2013). Based on such a description, the hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
 
H2: Institutional ownership has a negative effect on earnings management 
Leverage is the use of assets and sources of funds (source of funds) by 
companies that have fixed costs (expenses) to increase the potential profits of 
shareholders (Sartono, 2001). According to (Barus & Leliani, 2013) leverage ratio is 
the ratio that exists in financial statements that can find out how much the company is 
financed by debt with the ability of the company described by capital, or it can also 
show some of the assets used as the guarantor of the debt. (Radyasinta & 
Kusmuriyanto, 2014) concluded that companies that have a high leverage ratio mean 
having a proportion of debt that is higher than the proportion of assets will tend to 
manipulate in the form of earnings management. Variable leverage can be calculated 
using a ratio of total liabilities (short-term debt and long-term debt) to the total assets 
owned by the company at the end of the year. 
Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and total assets of the company 
(Agustia, 2013). This ratio will show the number of assets owned by companies 
financed by debt. The results of research conducted by (Agustia, 2013), (Guna & 
Herawaty Arleen, 2000) show that leverage affects earnings management. Based on 
such a description, the hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H3: Leverage has a positive effect on earnings management. 
Company size is a company structure that shows the scale of a company. The 
size of the company shows the amount of experience and ability to grow a company 
that indicates the ability and level of risk in managing investments provided by 
investors to increase their prosperity (Apriyani, 2013). 
The size of the company influences investors' decision making; large companies 
will be more trusted by investors to invest their capital; in the end, large companies 
have less possibility to practice earnings management. The statement is by the results of 
a study conducted by (Prasetya & Gayatri, 2016) that firm size has a negative effect on 
earnings management. Based on such a description, the hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
 
H4: Firm size has a negative effect on earning management. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Earnings management is earnings manipulation conducted by management to 
achieve certain goals. The motivation of this manipulation is to keep.  
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Framework 
 
 
METHODS 
 
This research was conducted to test the hypothesis. The independent variables 
were managerial ownership, institutional ownership, leverage, and company size; while 
the dependent variable studied was earnings management. This research was carried out 
in real environmental situations with a public company analysis unit. The time 
dimension used in this study is pooling data so that it will use SPSS data processing 
tools. The population in this study are all property and real estate companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 2015-2017. The sampling 
technique was done by purposive sampling to get a representative sample according to 
the specified criteria. Property and real estate companies listed Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) during 2015-2017 and financial statements in Rupiah (IDR), 
Companies which do not delist and IPO’s during 2015-2017, companies have positive 
earnings (Net income, Operating Income). 
The dependent variable in this study is earnings management with a ratio scale 
measurement as measured by the Discretionary Accruals (DA) proxy that uses the 
Kothari model. This measurement is based on research conducted by (Khotari, Leone, 
& Wesley, 2001).  
 
Discretionary accruals are calculated using the total accruals (TA): TAt = NCAt - CLt 
Then measured with NDA (non-discretionary accrual/NDA): 
NDAt = α0 + α1 (  + α2  + α3  + α4 ROAt-1 + e 
Discretionary Accrual (DA) can be measured as follows: DAt =  - NDAt 
 
Descriptions: 
TAt = Total Accrual in period  
NCAt = Current Asset  
CLt  = Change Non Current Liability 
NDAt = Discretionary Accrual 
ΔREVt   = Change in Earning  
Good Corporate Governance: 
Managerial Ownership (X1) 
Institutional Ownership (X2) 
 
 
 
 
Leverage (X3) 
Company Size (X4) 
Earning Management 
(Y) 
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ΔARt = Change in Receivable  
PPEt = Property, Plant, And Equipment  
ROAt = Return On Assets  
At-1 = Total Asset 
e = Error 
DAt = Discretionary Accrual in Period 
 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of company shares owned by institutions or 
institutions such as insurance companies, banks, investment companies, and ownership 
of other institutions (Tarjo, 2008). 
 
Institutional Ownership:   
 
Managerial ownership is several share ownership by management to the total number 
of shares outstanding (Jao & Pagalung, 2011). 
 
Managerial ownership:  
 
Leverage is the use of assets and sources of funds by companies that have fixed costs to 
increase the potential profits of shareholders (Sartono, 2001). Leverage is measured by: 
 
Leverage ratio:  
 
Company size is a company structure that shows the scale of a company. Company size 
shows the amount of experience and ability to grow a company that indicates the ability 
and level of risk. Company size can be calculated by: 
 
 
 
Research Regression Model 
Hypothesis testing is done by multiple regression analysis using the regression equation 
as follows:  
 
EM = β0 + β1 KM + β2 KI + β3 LEV + β4 CS + e 
Descriptions: 
β0 = Constant 
β1,2,3,4,5,6, = Regression Coefficients of Each Proxy 
EM = Earning Management 
KM = Managerial Ownership 
KI = Institutional Ownership 
CS = Company Size 
LEV = Leverage 
e = error 
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DISCUSSION  
 
Based on the criteria of the sample used, the following data are obtained: 
 
Table 1 
Sampling Criteria  
No. Descriptions Total  
1 
Property and real estate companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
during 2015-2017 and financial statements in Rupiah (IDR) 
48 
2 Companies delisting and IPO’s during 2015-2017 (6) 
3  Companies have negative earnings (Net Income, Operating Income) (7) 
4 Total Companies in the research period 2015-2017 35 
5 Total Data in research period 2015-2017 (35 companies x 3 years) 105 
6 Outlier (15) 
Total Data 90 
  
 The number of samples: 90 samples, so taking into account that the number has 
exceeded the minimum sample size (n=30) in the research conducted for correlational 
studies and causal-comparative studies. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistical analysis tables are presented as follows: 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
KM 90 .0000 .0786 .007136 .0174390 
KI 90 .1616 .9947 .727737 .2124626 
LEV 90 .1057 .7873 .407769 .1547495 
CS 90 25.8920 31.4580 29.250644 1.3118177 
EARNING 
MANAGEMENT 
90 -.1962 .2173 .009204 .0717089 
Valid N (listwise) 90     
 
 The managerial ownership variable, the statistical results show that the 
minimum value is -0.000, and the maximum value is 0.0786. The average value of the 
company value generated from 90 samples is 0.0071. 
 The institutional ownership variable, the statistical results show that the 
minimum value is -0.1616, and the maximum value is 0.9947. The average value of the 
company value generated from 90 samples is 0.7277. 
 The leverage variable, the statistical results show that the minimum value is 
0.1057, and the maximum value is 0.7873. The average value of the company value 
generated from 90 samples is 0.4077. 
The company size variable, the statistical results show that the minimum value is 
25.89, and the maximum value is 31.45. The average value of the company value 
generated from 90 samples is 29.25. 
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The earning management variable, the statistical results show that the minimum 
value is -0.1962, and the maximum value is 0.2173. The average value of the company 
value generated from 90 samples is 0.0092. 
 Multicollinearity test aims to test whether the regression model found an indication 
of a correlation between independent variables. The Multicollinearity Test results are 
presented in the following table: 
Table 3 
Multicollinearity Test 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
KM .883 1.132 
KI .923 1.083 
LEV .776 1.288 
CS .807 1.239 
 
 The results of the VIF Test show that the four independent variables did not occur 
due to the VIF value of each independent variable <10 and the tolerance value of each 
independent variable> 0.1. 
 Autocorrelation test was used to test linear regression models about the effect of 
data from previous observations. The Autocorrelation Test results are presented in the 
following table: 
 
Table 4 
Autocorrelation Test (Durbin-Watson) 
 Durbin-Watson 
Predictor: KM, KI, LEV, CS 
Dependent: Earning Management 
1.901 
 
 The Durbin-Watson test results in table 4 show a DW value of 1.901; while in the 
Durbin-Watson (DW) table for "k" = 4 and N = 90 large Durbin-Watson table: dl (outer 
limit) = 1.5656 and du (inner limit) = 1.7508 ; 4 - du = 2,249 and 4 - dl = 2,434. 
Because the Durbin-Watson (DW) value is 1.901 greater than the limit (du) 1.7508 and 
Durbin-Watson (DW) is less than 2.249, it can be concluded that Durbin Watson (DW) 
test cannot reject H0 which states that there is no positive or negative autocorrelation or 
it can be concluded that there is no autocorrelation. 
 Heteroscedasticity test aims to test whether the regression model has a similarity in 
residual variance, one observation to another observation. The Heteroscedasticity Test 
results are presented in the following table:    
 
Table 5 
Heteroscedasticity Test (Glestjer) 
Variable Sig. 2 Tailed 
KM .269 
KI .863 
LEV .434 
CS .200 
Constant  .097 
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 The Heteroscedasticity Test results in the table show the significance values of the 
four independent variables, more than 0.05. Thus it can be concluded that there is no 
problem of heteroscedasticity in the regression model. 
The normality test aims to determine whether in a residual regression model, the 
independent variables and dependent variables have a normal distribution or not. 
 
Table 6 
Normality Test (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) 
Item N Asymp. Sig (2 Tailed) 
Unstandardized Residual 
90 0.200 
 
The significant value for Kolmogorov-Smirnov must be above 0.05 or 5%. The 
sample results in Table 4.6 show that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov value is 0.200 > 0.05 
so that the residuals are declared to be normally distributed. 
 
Table 7 
Determination Coefficient Test Result 
Predictor Adjusted R-Square 
Managerial ownership, Institutional Ownership, Leverage, 
Company Size to Earning Management 0.198 
 
 Based on the table 7 above, it is known that the coefficient of determination seen 
from the value of Adj R
2
 is 0.198. That is, 19.8% of the variation of the dependent 
variable earning management can be explained by independent variables (Managerial 
ownership, Institutional Ownership, Leverage, and Company Size) while the remaining 
80.2% (100%-19.8%) is explained by other variables not included in the equation. 
 
Table 8 
Simultaneous Significant Test (F-Test) Result 
 Model F Sig. 
Dependent: Earning Management 
Predictor Managerial ownership, Institutional Ownership, 
Leverage, Company Size to Earning Management 
*support statistically on alpha 5% 
Regression 
 
 
6.508 
 
 
0.000 
 
Table 9 
Significant Test of Individual Parameters (t-Test) Result 
 Unstandardized 
Hypothesis 
 Coefficients Beta Sig. (One Tail) 
(Constant) -.182 .428  
KM 4.923 .000 Ha Rejected 
KI -.795 .214 Ha Rejected 
LEV -.957 .170 Ha Rejected 
CS .375 .354 Ha Rejected 
 
  
 28   The Influence of Corporate Governance, Company Size______________________ 
 
 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Table 9 shows that the significance of managerial ownership is 0.000<0.05 with a 
coefficient value of 4.923, so that the decision is H1 does not been accepted. It can be 
concluded that managerial ownership has a positive effect on earning management. But 
the positive significant coefficient reflected that greater ownership would provide 
managers with deeper entrenchment and, therefore, greater scope for opportunistic 
behavior (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988), which increase earnings management.   
 The significance value of institutional ownership is 0.214>0.05 with a coefficient 
value of -0.795 that the decision is H2 rejected. It can be concluded that institutional 
ownership does not affect earnings management. Institutional ownership has no effect 
on earnings management. Indicating that there are many or at least the voting rights 
owned by the institution cannot influence the size of the profit management carried out 
by management. The results of this study are in line with Ujiyantho dan Pramuka, 
(2007). In addition, the views or concepts of Porter (in Midiastuty & Machfoedz, 2003) 
also say that institutional ownership is the owner who focuses more on current 
earnings. 
 The significance value of Leverage is 0.170>0.05 with a coefficient value of -0.957, 
so that the Hypothesis 3 is rejected. It can be concluded that leverage does not affect on 
earning management. Indicating that the level of leverage owed by the company does 
not affect the level of earnings management carried out by management. The results of 
this study are contrary to the results of research by Widaningdyah (2001) which 
explains that the higher the level of corporate leverage will make the earnings 
management motivation for the board of directors increasingly high. 
 The significance value of Company Size is 0.354>0.05 with a coefficient value of 
0.357, so that the Hypothesis 4 is rejected. It can be concluded that the Company Size 
does not affect earnings management. The influence of company size on earnings 
management shows that the motivation of the board of directors to do earnings 
management is not based on company size (Sosiawan, 2012). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
From this research, the results of the study shows that managerial ownership 
does not have a negative effect but contrarely, it has a positive effect on earnings 
management. The results of the study indicate that institutional ownership, leverage is 
proved to have a negative effect on earning management.. 
Further research for the suggestion, use the method of calculating financial ratios 
with other formulas, increase the number of independent variables and multiply the 
sample not only in variables, firm size, and leverage on earnings management practices 
in property but also other types companies. 
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